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“SHOUTING ‘FIRE’ IN A THEATER”: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW’S MOST ENDURING ANALOGY
Carlton F.W. Larson*
ABSTRACT
In 1919, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes introduced the specter of a man falsely
shouting “fire” in a theater into First Amendment law. Nearly one hundred years later,
this remains the most enduring analogy in constitutional law. It has been relied on in
hundreds of constitutional cases, and it has permeated popular discourse on the scope
of individual rights.
This Article examines both the origins and the later life of Holmes’s theater
analogy. Part I is a detective story, seeking to solve the mystery of how Holmes came
up with this particular example. This story takes us to the forgotten world of the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, where false shouts of “fire” in theaters were
a pervasive problem that killed hundreds of people both in the United States and
Great Britain. The person who shouted “fire” in a crowded theater was a recogniz-
able stock villain of popular culture, condemned in newspapers, magazines, and
books from coast to coast. The analogy, lifted by Holmes from a federal prosecutor
in Cleveland, was rooted in this larger world of popular culture, which would have
understood the analogy as shorthand for stupid, harmful speech. Recovering this
forgotten world also answers another question: Why do lawyers and non-lawyers
alike refer to “shouting ‘fire’ in a crowded theater” rather than “falsely shouting ‘fire’
in a theater and causing a panic,” which is what Holmes actually wrote? Along the way,
we will encounter a real detective and even a mustachioed villain.
Part II is based on an empirical study of the 278 subsequent judicial opinions
that employ the theater analogy. Among other findings, this Article shows that the
Supreme Court has rarely employed the analogy in majority opinions, but it has
flourished in concurring and dissenting opinions. In lower courts, use of the analogy
is increasing. Opinions that invoke the analogy, not surprisingly, typically reject free
speech claims, but opinions that paraphrase Holmes are, counter-intuitively, more
receptive to free speech claims than opinions that quote Holmes precisely.
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This Article concludes by noting that the theater analogy has largely lost its ca-
pacity to frighten in the visceral way that Holmes’s audience would have understood
it. Although it persists in constitutional law, it has become rarified and largely ab-
stract, perhaps contributing in some small way to the general libertarian trend of
modern First Amendment law.
INTRODUCTION
When I introduce the subject of free speech to my law students, I ask them to
provide examples of speech that is obviously unprotected by the First Amendment.
Inevitably, one of the first answers is “shouting ‘fire’ in a crowded theater.” I follow
up by asking, “Suppose there is a fire in the theater. Could you shout ‘fire’ then?”
and the student usually answers, “Yes.”1
I then tell the students that this image comes from Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s
opinion in the 1919 case of Schenck v. United States,2 in which the Court unani-
mously upheld a conviction under the Espionage Act for distributing flyers opposed
to the draft.3 Writing for the Court, Justice Holmes argued, “The most stringent
protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre
and causing a panic.”4
My students nonetheless instinctively paraphrase Holmes’s words as “shouting
‘fire’ in a crowded theater.” They are not alone. A Google search reveals over 200,000
hits for “shouting fire in a crowded theater” but only 53,000 hits for the Holmes ver-
sion.5 Just one year after Schenck, United States Attorney General Mitchell Palmer,
in congressional testimony, claimed, “A man may say what he will, as has often been
1 A New Jersey appellate judge recently asked: “Is there something wrong about yelling
‘fire’ in a crowded theater if there is a fire?” In re Estate of Thomas, No. A-4320-02T2, 2004
WL 943629, at *38 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 3, 2004) (Fisher, J., dissenting). It is
possible, that even if there is a fire, shouting “fire” might not be the best way of dealing with
it. See, e.g., Walter Lippmann, Today and Tomorrow: The Washingtonian Principle, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 19, 1940, at A4 (“[E]ven if someone thinks there is a fire, it is his duty to keep
cool and collected and to remember that in human affairs a panic is far worse than a fire. For
a fire can be put out. But a panic is an almost certain disaster.”).
2 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
3 Id. at 48–49.
4 Id. at 52.
5 Even writers who purport to quote Holmes directly often get it wrong. See, e.g.,
CHRISTOPHER M. FINAN, FROM THE PALMER RAIDS TO THE PATRIOT ACT: A HISTORY OF THE
FIGHT FOR FREE SPEECH IN AMERICA 28 (2007) (“‘The most stringent protection of free speech
would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a crowded theater, and causing a panic,’
[Holmes] wrote.”); Charles G. Brown, Murder by the Book: Is the Publisher Responsible?,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 6, 1996, at A21 (“As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes pointed out, ‘You
can’t shout “fire” in a crowded theater.’”). Legal scholar Fred Friendly, correcting President
George H. W. Bush’s removal of “falsely,” nonetheless incorrectly added “crowded.” Fred W.
Friendly, Letter to the Editor, Falsely Shouting Fire, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1989, at E22.
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said; but if he cries ‘fire’ in a crowded theater, with the intent to injure the people
there assembled, certainly his right of free speech does not protect him against the
punishment that is his just desert [sic].”6 Two years after Schenck, an article in a
legal periodical claimed, “A man has no right to shout ‘fire’ in a crowded theatre, to use
a familiar illustration.”7 Even the United States Supreme Court has referred to shout-
ing “‘fire’ in a crowded theater.”8
On a conceptual level, however, the Holmes version and the paraphrase differ
in three significant ways. First, Holmes includes the critical element of falsity, which
the paraphrase omits. A person shouting “fire” in response to a real fire (or shouting
“fire” as part of his or her lines on-stage) presents very different issues than a person
deliberately making a false statement. Second, the paraphrase requires the theater
to be crowded. But why does the theater need to be crowded for the speech to be
unprotected? A false shout of “fire” that disrupts a performance causes harm to the
theater owner and poses risks to the attendees even if only four people are in the
audience. Third, Holmes refers to “causing a panic,” thus suggesting a requirement
of actual harm, whereas the paraphrase does not.9 Thus, falsely shouting “fire” in an
entirely empty theater might not give rise to legal liability.
Holmes’s theater analogy is a perfect retort to the frivolous argument that all
speech, regardless of context or consequences, is immunized from governmental
regulation. But, in the context of Schenck, it was entirely beside the point. A false
shout of “fire” in a theater is a false statement of fact; the flyers in Schenck made
statements of political opinion.10 The audience in a theater is captive to a speaker in
a way that the readers of the flyers in Schenck were not. The panic in the theater is
immediate and not easily countered by more speech; the flyers in Schenck created
no similar risk of imminent harm.11
The inaptness of the analogy was noted almost immediately. Writing a few months
after Schenck was decided, Professor Ernst Freund of the University of Chicago Law
School found the analogy “manifestly inappropriate” in the context of “implied
provocation in connection with political offenses.”12 Professor Zechariah Chafee of
Harvard Law School argued that a much closer analogy to Schenck was a “man who
gets up in a theater between the acts and informs the audience honestly but perhaps
6 Sedition: Hearing on S. 3317, H.R. 10650 and 12041 Before the H. Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 66th Cong. 35 (1920) (statement of Mitchell Palmer, Att’y Gen. of the United States).
7 Elwood S. Jones, Free Speech and Laws in Derogation Thereof, 93 CENT. L.J. 348, 349
(1921).
8 Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 536 (1945) (“We have here nothing comparable to the
case where use of the word ‘fire’ in a crowded theater creates a clear and present danger . . . .”).
9 Curiously, Holmes’s own formulation of the “clear and present danger” test in Schenck
does not require actual harm, only a significant risk of harm. 249 U.S. at 52.
10 See id. at 52–53.
11 See id.
12 Ernst Freund, The Debs Case and Freedom of Speech, NEW REPUBLIC, May 3, 1919,
at 13, 14.
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mistakenly that the fire exits are too few or locked.”13 Such perplexing cases “cannot
be solved by the multiplication of obvious examples, but only by the development
of a rational principle to mark the limits of constitutional protection.”14 H. L. Mencken
argued in 1926 that the theater example was unique because “there is no opportunity
for persons who know that there is no fire to state the fact calmly, and prove it.”15
One of Freund’s successors at the University of Chicago, Professor Harry Kalven,
would later describe the analogy as “trivial and misleading,” noting that because it
“is so wholly apolitical, it lacks the requisite complexity for dealing with any serious
speech problem likely to confront the legal system.”16
Professor Vincent Blasi of Columbia Law School has defended the theater analogy
as resting on “falsity, absence of a general idea, and audience vulnerability.”17 As such,
it is primarily about “excluding certain verbal activities from the ambit of First Amend-
ment concern,” rather than supporting the proposition that any speech can be limited
if the resulting harms are great enough.18 This interpretation sensibly domesticates
the analogy within modern First Amendment doctrine, but it fits uneasily with Schenck
itself, where one could hardly argue that the anti-war pamphlets lacked a general
idea or rested on an obvious falsity. Moreover, as Holmes argued in Schenck:
The question in every case is whether the words used are used in
such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear
and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils
that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity
and degree.19
At least in Schenck, Holmes seemed to suggest that all speech was subject to the clear
and present danger test.20
Despite all of its limitations, the theater analogy is the most enduring analogy
in the constitutional canon.21 As shorthand for why rights are not unlimited, it can
13 Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Freedom of Speech in War Time, 32 HARV. L. REV. 932, 944
(1919).
14 Id.
15 H. L. Mencken, On Liberty, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Mar. 21, 1926, at H1.
16 HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA 133–
34 (Jamie Kalven ed., 1988).
17 Vincent Blasi, Shouting “Fire!” in a Theater and Vilifying Corn Dealers, 39 CAP. U.
L. REV. 535, 565 (2011).
18 Id. at 567.
19 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (emphasis added).
20 See id.
21 “Shouting ‘fire’ in a theater” is best described as an analogy, not a metaphor. Unlike
later cases where the Court would describe radical speech as a spark (a true metaphor), the
theater analogy typifies the analogical reasoning style of the common law. Although it is not
strictly a comparison of one thing to another, its use of the hypothetical case to make an argument
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hardly be beaten. It has been relied on in hundreds of constitutional cases and has
permeated popular discourse on the scope of individual rights.22 A 1963 Wall Street
Journal editorial referred to the “classic case” that “free speech does not include the
right to shout ‘Fire!’ in a crowded theater.”23 The analogy appears regularly in the
speeches of political leaders.24 Even comic writers have played with the analogy,
from Tom Stoppard’s Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are Dead,25 to a parody of
social science research:
A sample of forty-seven movie theaters across the country was
selected for the experiment. The sample was divided into a “test”
group and three “control” groups. In the test group, a graduate
student in the audience shouted “fire” at a randomly chosen point
in the performance, and the results were observed and tabulated. In
control group 1, patrons viewed the film under normal circum-
stances. In control group 2, an assistant shouted “fire,” and then the
theater was actually set ablaze. In control group 3, the theater was
torched without any warning cry. Observers assigned the resultant
behavior of the crowd a value on the Wassenberg-Schevitsky
Panic Scale.26
The humorist Russell Baker complained, “Lawyers aren’t much for metaphorical
speech either. Their favorite rhetorical device is simile. ‘Like shouting “Fire!” in a
is analogical. On the use of fire metaphors in free speech cases, see HAIG BOSMAJIAN, META-
PHOR AND REASON IN JUDICIAL OPINIONS 186–98 (1992); ROBERT L. TSAI, ELOQUENCE AND
REASON: CREATING A FIRST AMENDMENT CULTURE 52–60 (2008); Robert L. Tsai, Fire,
Metaphor, and Constitutional Myth-Making, 93 GEO. L.J. 181, 182 (2004).
22 See infra Part II.
23 Rights Without Responsibility, WALL ST. J., Oct. 1, 1963, at 14.
24 See, e.g., Gerald R. Ford, Crime in America, in A RECORD OF PRESS CONFERENCE
STATEMENTS MADE BY SENATOR EVERETT MCKINLEY DIRKSEN AND REPRESENTATIVE
GERALD R. FORD FOR THE REPUBLICAN LEADERSHIP OF THE CONGRESS, S. DOC. NO. 90-61,
at 11 (1st Sess. 1967) (“No one has a right to shout ‘Fire!’ in a theatre.”); H.R. REP. NO. 82-2510,
at 47 (2d Sess.1952) (testimony of Thomas J. Fitzgerald) (“I think it was Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes who made the famous statement that freedom of speech does not entitle a person to
shout ‘fire’ in a crowded theater.”); Michael Cooper, Debate on Role Played by Anti-Abortion
Talk, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1995, at 16 (quoting the President of Planned Parenthood who said,
“This is tantamount to shouting, ‘Fire!’ in a crowded theater. We have a crowded theater; just
look at the spate of murders at clinics in the last few years.”).
25 TOM STOPPARD, ROSENCRANTZ AND GUILDENSTERN ARE DEAD 60 (1967) (“Ros: Fire! /
Guil jumps up / Guil: Where? / Ros: It’s all right—I’m demonstrating the misuse of free
speech. To prove that it exists.”).
26 TOM WELLER, Shouting “Fire” in a Crowded Theater: Experimental Evidence, in CVL-
TVRE MADE STVPID 17 (1987); see also Dave Barry, Need a Yacht? Don’t Waste Your Money;
Exercise Your Rights, CHIC. TRIB., Nov. 10, 1985, at H10 (“[Y]ou can’t shout ‘FIRE!’ in a
crowded theater. Even if there IS a fire, you can’t shout it. A union worker has to shout it.”).
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crowded theater’—that’s about as close to poetry as lawyer talk ever comes. And
that’s an antique from the early part of the century.”27
This Article explores two neglected aspects of the shouting “fire” in a theater
analogy. First, it looks backward from 1919 to the source of Justice Holmes’s analogy.
Was this simply a clever hypothetical tossed off by a brilliant jurist known for his
aphorisms? Or does the analogy draw on something deeper? After surveying pre-
vious attempts to answer this question, this Article argues that the analogy is rooted
in a world in which false shouts of “fire” in theaters were a perennial problem,
resulting in the highly publicized deaths of hundreds of people. As a result, the per-
son who falsely shouted “fire” in a crowded theater was a recognizable stock villain
of the late nineteenth century. Holmes’s analogy was thus far from hypothetical—it
described one of the most frightening forms of speech that could be imagined, the
archetype of stupid, harmful speech. Recovering this lost world also answers another
question: Why do lawyers and non-lawyers alike routinely refer to “shouting ‘fire’
in a crowded theater,” rather than the more precise version offered by Justice Holmes?
They do so because they are drawing on a linguistic convention that long predated
Holmes and which has survived long after Schenck.
Second, this Article looks forward from 1919 to examine the life of the analogy
in judicial opinions, focusing initially on United States Supreme Court opinions and
then turning to a quantitative analysis of the 278 judicial opinions that invoke the
analogy in free speech cases. When the Supreme Court returned to the analogy in the
1940s, it used the conventional paraphrase, not the more precise version formulated by
Justice Holmes.28 Although the Court has not relied on the analogy extensively in ma-
jority opinions, individual Justices have frequently invoked it in separate opinions.29
The analogy, far from fading into obsolescence, has displayed increasing vitality in
recent years. In lower courts, opinions that invoke the analogy, not surprisingly, typi-
cally reject free speech claims, but opinions that employ the paraphrase are, counter-
intuitively, more receptive to free speech claims than opinions that quote Holmes
precisely.30 Similarly, appellate court opinions that invoke the analogy are more
receptive to free speech claims than trial court opinions that invoke the analogy.31
This Article concludes by observing that the theater analogy is no longer
frightening in the visceral manner that Holmes’s audience would have understood
it. The central analogy of First Amendment law has become an abstract debating
point, stripped of immediate relevance or any sense of serious danger. As such, it
provides little resistance to the general libertarian valence of modern First Amend-
ment doctrine.
27 Russell Baker, Like Lead to the Romans, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1993, at 19.
28 See infra Part II.A.
29 See infra Part II.A.
30 See infra Part II.B.
31 See infra Part II.B.
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I. THE ORIGINS OF THE ANALOGY
It was argued in 1983 that the “specter of a man shouting in a theater has . . .
preoccupied first amendment scholarship,”32 but, until recently, there has been little
interest in the source of Holmes’s theater analogy.33 In his influential 1997 book, Free
Speech in its Forgotten Years, Professor David Rabban of the University of Texas
School of Law made the offhand suggestion that Holmes may have drawn the analogy
from an earlier case in which a man had solicited his employee to burn down a build-
ing in an attempt to secure insurance money.34
Five years later, Rabban’s Texas colleague, Lucas Powe, published Searching for
the False Shout of ‘Fire,’ the first, and, to date, only article directly addressing the ori-
gins of the theater analogy.35 Powe was unimpressed by Rabban’s insurance argument:
With full respect to a long-time friend and colleague, that is a
stretch. A man solicits an employee to burn down his house for
insurance purposes. First drop out the employee. Next make the
house a theater. Then place people in it. Get rid of the fire (and
therefore the insurance rationale). Have a false shout instead.
Bishop Occum created his razor for reasoning like this.36
Powe instead argued that Holmes’s most likely sources for the analogy were two
notorious incidents in the decade prior to Schenck in which false shouts of “fire” had
created harmful and deadly panics.37 The first occurred in Canonsburg, Pennsylvania,
in 1911, when someone falsely shouted “fire” in an opera house that was showing
a movie.38 Twenty-six people were killed, and fifty people were seriously injured in
the ensuing panic.39 The second occurred in Calumet, Michigan, in 1913, where striking
copper miners and their families were celebrating Christmas Eve on the second floor
of a meeting hall.40 An unknown person yelled “fire,” and the resulting panic killed
seventy-three people, most of them children.41
32 Steven Shiffrin, Book Review, Government Speech and the Falsification of Consent,
96 HARV. L. REV. 1745, 1745 (1983).
33 See THE FUNDAMENTAL HOLMES: A FREE SPEECH CHRONICLE AND READER 231–33
(Ronald K. L. Collins ed., 2010).
34 DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS 297–98 (1997).
35 L. A. Powe, Jr., Searching for the False Shout of “Fire,” 19 CONST. COMMENT. 345
(2002).
36 Id. at 348.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 348–49.
39 Id. at 349.
40 Id.
41 Id.
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Although there was no direct evidence that Holmes was aware of these inci-
dents, Powe argued that Holmes had a particular interest in both theaters and fires
and, therefore, likely drew on these examples when writing the Schenck opinion.42
Powe felt this explanation beat Rabban’s argument, at least “until something better
comes along.”43
Although Powe was unaware of it, there already was something better. Powe
had plausibly assumed that Justice Holmes had invented the theater analogy in
Schenck, but this assumption was incorrect. The analogy was first used in the 1918
Cleveland trial of socialist Eugene Debs for violations of the Espionage Act.44 The
prosecuting United States Attorney, Edwin Wertz, argued to the jury that “a man in
a crowded auditorium, or any theatre, who yells ‘fire’ and there is no fire, and a
panic ensues and someone is trampled to death, may be rightfully indicted and charged
with murder.”45 Wertz’s use of this analogy had been largely forgotten by constitu-
tional historians, but it was noted in a 1919 book about Eugene Debs46 and discussed
in a 1987 article in the Indiana Magazine of History.47
The connection to Schenck is clear. Debs appealed his conviction to the Supreme
Court, where it was affirmed in a unanimous opinion by Justice Holmes, one week
after Schenck.48 Although legal historian Melvin Urofsky has argued that there is no
direct evidence that Holmes was aware of Wertz’s closing argument,49 the circum-
stantial evidence is compelling. The much more probable case is set forth by
Professor Thomas Healy of Seton Hall University School of Law in his 2013 book,
The Great Dissent: How Oliver Wendell Holmes Changed His Mind—and Changed
the History of Free Speech in America.50 Healy argues that Holmes adapted this
analogy from the record of the Debs case into the final form it took in Schenck.51
The Holmes version is far tighter and more rhetorically effective than the meander-
ing example offered by Wertz, as the parallels below indicate:
42 Id. at 351–52.
43 Id. at 352.
44 ERNEST FREEBERG, DEMOCRACY’S PRISONER: EUGENE V. DEBS, THE GREAT WAR, AND
THE RIGHT TO DISSENT 102 (2008).
45 THOMAS HEALY, THE GREAT DISSENT: HOW OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES CHANGED HIS
MIND—AND CHANGED THE HISTORY OF FREE SPEECH IN AMERICA 91 (2013).
46 DAVID KARSNER, DEBS: HIS AUTHORIZED LIFE AND LETTERS 45 (1919).
47 David L. Sterling, In Defense of Debs: The Lawyers and the Espionage Act Case, 83
IND. MAG. OF HIST. 17, 32–34 (1987).
48 See Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 216–17 (1919).
49 Melvin I. Urofsky, The Trial of Eugene V. Debs, 1918, in JUSTICE AND LEGAL CHANGE
ON THE SHORES OF LAKE ERIE: A HISTORY OF THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN
DISTRICT OF OHIO 97, 118 n.50 (Paul Finkelman & Roberta Sue Alexander eds., 2012).
50 HEALY, supra note 45, at 91.
51 Id. at 97, 268–69 n.95.
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Holmes Wertz
“falsely” “and there is no fire”
“a theater” “crowded auditorium, or any theatre”
“and causing a panic” “and a panic ensues and someone is
trampled to death.”
Holmes’s analogy used twenty-three words; Wertz’s analogy used thirty-five.52
Nonetheless, Edwin Wertz merits at least a footnote in the annals of constitu-
tional history. Holmes might have used the theater analogy in any event, but it is
Wertz who first used it in a First Amendment case.53 Of all the sources upon which
Holmes might have drawn when writing Schenck, Wertz’s closing argument in the
Debs case is by far the most plausible.
But this of course raises a further question: How did Wertz come up with the
theater analogy? Was there anything in his life or background that made him par-
ticularly drawn to this example? Although reasonably well-known in Ohio during
his lifetime, he did not leave a significant historical legacy. Wertz was born in 1875
in Wayne County, Ohio, and graduated from Ohio State with degrees in philosophy
and law.54 In 1900, he was admitted to the Ohio bar and, in 1903, was elected as a
Democrat to the Ohio state legislature.55 He served two terms, supporting highway
legislation, education reform, prison reform, and the regulation of railroads and
mines.56 From 1915 to 1923, he was the United States Attorney for the Northern
District of Ohio, where he was responsible for the prosecution of Eugene Debs.57 A
1943 obituary described him as a “rough-and-tumble lawyer of the old school.”58
As a life-long resident of the greater Cleveland area, Wertz was in closer geo-
graphical proximity to the false shouts identified by Lucas Powe than was Justice
Holmes.59 Canonsburg, Pennsylvania, is only 128 miles from Wertz’s residence in
Wooster, Ohio,60 and thus a likely candidate for familiarity. Similarly, the Calumet
52 Compare Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1918), with HEALY, supra note
45, at 91.
53 See Urofsky, supra note 49, at 109–10.
54 Biography of Edwin S. Wertz, N. CENT. OHIO BIOGRAPHIES, http://www.onlinebiographies
.info/oh/nco/wertz-es.htm [http://perma.cc/4SRF-D88D] [hereinafter Biography of Wertz].
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Lawyer Who Prosecuted Eugene Debs Is Dead; Loved Impromptu Debate at Bar
Conventions, 5 AM. L. & LAWYERS 6 (Nov. 16, 1943).
59 See Biography of Wertz, supra note 54.
60 Driving Directions From Canonsburg, PA, to Wooster, OH, GOOGLEMAPS, http://www
.google.com/maps [http://perma.cc/YB2N-LB68].
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disaster, although not especially close to Cleveland, was still in a neighboring state
and closer to Wertz than it was to Holmes. Moreover, as a legislator who had taken
an interest in improving the lives of miners, Wertz may well have found the story
of Calumet both fascinating and horrifying.
Calumet is located on the remote Keweenaw Peninsula, which juts out from
Michigan’s Upper Peninsula into Lake Superior.61 The region is known as Copper
Country, after the enormous copper mines that once dominated the local economy.62
In July 1913, the copper miners, led by the Western Federation of Miners (WFM),
went on strike.63 The mine managers refused to negotiate, and the strike dragged on
for months.64
By December, the Women’s Auxiliary of the WFM had become concerned about
the children of the striking miners, whose parents might not be able to afford Christ-
mas presents.65 The Auxiliary organized a Christmas Eve party for the children on
the second floor of Calumet’s Italian Hall.66 The party proved enormously popular,
and approximately seven hundred people crowded into the Hall’s event space to listen
to Christmas carols.67 The children had begun processing to the stage to receive their
donated presents when someone burst into the room and shouted, “Fire!”68 Witnesses
later testified that the man was wearing the button of the “Citizens’ Alliance,” a front
group for mine management.69
There was no fire, but people had reason to be frightened.70 The earlier incarna-
tion of Italian Hall had burned down in a fire in 1907.71 The new Hall was built with
modern safety features designed to minimize harm in the event of a fire.72 There were
multiple staircases to the second floor, a fire escape that led directly outside, and exit
doors that swung outward.73 But most people in the Hall were unaware of the other
exits, and a large swarm of people rushed to the staircase that led to the entrance on
the street.74 It appears that someone tripped on the stairs, which caused others to trip
61 STEVE LEHTO, DEATH’S DOOR: THE TRUTH BEHIND THE ITALIAN HALL DISASTER AND
THE STRIKE OF 1913, at 1 (2d ed. 2013).
62 Id. at 13.
63 Id. at 33.
64 Id. at 52–55.
65 Id. at 167–68.
66 Id. at 168–69.
67 Id. at 169–70.
68 Id. at 170–71.
69 Id. at 152, 170–71.
70 Id. at 1.
71 Id. at 168.
72 Id. at 169.
73 GARY KAUNONEN & AARON GOINGS, COMMUNITY IN CONFLICT: A WORKING-CLASS
HISTORY OF THE 1913–14 MICHIGAN COPPER STRIKE AND THE ITALIAN HALL TRAGEDY
167–69 (2013); LEHTO, supra note 61, at 169.
74 LEHTO, supra note 61, at 9–10.
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in turn, and eventually people began piling up on top of each other.75 By the time the
incident was over, seventy-three people were dead, sixty-two of them children of the
striking miners.76
The overwhelming evidence suggests that someone entered Italian Hall and
deliberately shouted “fire.”77 It is likely that the person who did this was hostile to
the union and sought to disrupt the Christmas Eve festivities, even if he did not antic-
ipate the horrific death toll that his false shout would create.78 In terms of fatalities,
this is one of the worst acts of reckless homicide in the country’s history, and it remains
one of the country’s most significant unsolved crimes.79 Although Italian Hall was
not strictly a theater, it did involve an audience and a stage. It is not implausible that
Edwin Wertz, and possibly Justice Holmes as well, had this incident in mind when
referring to a “man falsely shouting ‘fire’ in a theater.” Constitutional law’s greatest
hypothetical villain may well be a real person with a real name. Is it possible, over
one hundred years later, to find out who he was? There are some tantalizing hints.
In his book Death’s Door, Michigan attorney Stephen Lehto argues that the
most likely suspect was a management-hired strike-breaker named Edward Manley.80
Curiously, Manley was pulled from the pile of people on the Italian Hall staircase,
a very strange place for a strike-breaker to be.81 Although Manley claimed that he
had run into the Hall from the street to provide assistance, Lehto argues that this
story is implausible.82 It is more likely, Lehto claims, that Manley had entered the
Hall, shouted “fire,” and then was caught in the ensuing stampede.83
Historians Gary Kaunonen and Aaron Goings reject Lehto’s Manley thesis, ar-
guing that the shouter almost certainly escaped from the building and would not
have been trapped in the pile of bodies in the stairwell.84 They discuss two other sus-
pects who had been identified in 1914.85 The first was tracked by a private detective
hired by the Calumet & Hecla mine.86 Several eyewitnesses reported that the shouter
had a mustache.87 The detective located a Calumet barber, who claimed that a man
came into his shop on the night of the incident, acted nervously, and requested that
the barber shave off his mustache.88 The detective then tracked down a man named
75 Id. at 10.
76 Id. at 178.
77 Id. at 325–38; see also KAUNONEN & GOINGS, supra note 73, at 219.
78 LEHTO, supra note 61, at 395–97; see also KAUNONEN & GOINGS, supra note 73, at 171.
79 See KAUNONEN & GOINGS, supra note 73, at 219.
80 LEHTO, supra note 61, at 174–77.
81 Id. at 175.
82 Id. at 176.
83 Id. at 174–75.
84 KAUNONEN & GOINGS, supra note 73, at 203.
85 Id. at 218.
86 Id. at 205.
87 Id. at 183, 201.
88 Id. at 211–12.
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Messner; this man had left Calumet early in the morning on Christmas Day, and,
when he returned several weeks later, he no longer had a mustache.89 Although this
would seem to be highly incriminating circumstantial evidence, Messner was not a
good physical match for the shouter.90 The shouter’s height (and the height of the
man in the barber shop) was described as around 5'7", whereas Messner’s height
was nearly 6’.91 At this point, the detective seems to have given up the search for the
shouter.92 The second suspect was identified by the local union of the WFM.93
“George” was seemingly a union organizer but was actually a spy for management.94
By April 1914, the union had concluded that George, who had fled to Minnesota,
was the man who had shouted “fire” at Italian Hall.95 His last name may have been
Bartoski or Sartoskila.96
These are all plausible candidates for the man who shouted “fire” in Italian Hall,
but there is regrettably no conclusive proof with respect to any of them, and it is un-
likely, at this date, that new evidence will emerge.97 Nonetheless, a decent argument
can be made that the widely publicized false shout at Calumet may have been in
Wertz’s and Holmes’s minds when they employed the theater analogy.
Further research, however, suggests that one should not overemphasize the
Calumet disaster. Although Calumet was unique because of its horrific death toll,
the cause of those deaths was not. False shouts of “fire” leading to deadly panics in
theaters were not uncommon in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.98
They would have been familiar to any person who attended the theater or who read
the newspapers. In 1876, someone in the gallery of a Cincinnati opera house falsely
shouted “fire.”99 The theater was packed with 2,500 people, mostly women and
89 Id. at 213.
90 Id. at 215; LEHTO, supra note 61, at 389–90.
91 KAUNONEN & GOINGS, supra note 73, at 210, 212, 215.
92 Id. at 216. Steve Lehto finds the entire account of the private detective fanciful and
argues that the detective was incompetent. LEHTO, supra note 61, at 385–91.
93 LEHTO, supra note 61, at 391.
94 KAUNONEN & GOINGS, supra note 73, at 217.
95 Id. at 217–18.
96 Id. at 218.
97 The Italian Hall disaster, including the false shout, would be immortalized later, some-
what inaccurately, in Woody Guthrie’s ballad “1913 Massacre.” WOODY GUTHRIE, 1913
Massacre (Woody Guthrie Publications, Inc. 1961), https://www.woodyguthrie.org/Lyrics
/Nineteen_Thirteen_Massacre.htm [http://perma.cc/6336-CQAF]. Steve Lehto notes that
many residents of Calumet viewed the song as “insulting.” LEHTO, supra note 61, at 354.
The disaster continues to generate bitter debate among scholars. For example, Steve Lehto
finds the work of Gary Kaunonen and Aaron Goings to be “unfounded,” “unscholarly,” and
full of “mistakes and misstatements.” Id. at 381, 383. Kaunonen and Goings find Lehto’s
work to be marred by a “combination of guesswork and embellished writing” and “loose playing
with sources and poor documentation.” KAUNONEN & GOINGS, supra note 73, at 201–02.
98 See, e.g., infra notes 99–111 and accompanying text.
99 A Fatal Panic: The Awful Calamity at Cincinnati, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Feb. 8, 1876, at 3.
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children.100 In the resulting panic, eight people were trampled to death, another died of
fright, and many others were seriously injured.101 In 1889, a false shout of “fire” at
a Johnstown, Pennsylvania, opera house led to the deaths of at least ten people and
injuries to fifty more.102 In 1895, at the Front Street Theater in Baltimore (the site of the
1864 Republican National Convention), a patron erroneously shouted “fire” after
seeing a gas jet being lit.103 In the ensuing panic, twenty-four people were trampled to
death, and twelve more were seriously injured.104 In 1901, a boy falsely shouted “fire”
during a theatrical performance at a building in Chicago.105 The shout led to a panic
that killed five people and injured fifty others.106 A month earlier, a performance in the
same building had been interrupted by a false shout of “fire,” resulting in eighteen
injuries.107 Police suspected that the same boy, who allegedly had “a mania for this
kind of work,” was responsible for both incidents.108 On Easter Eve 1906, a boy entered
St. Ludmilla’s Roman Catholic Church in Chicago and falsely shouted “fire.”109 The
resulting panic killed three young girls and an adult woman and injured numerous
others.110 In 1909, boys in the balcony of a Cleveland theater falsely shouted “fire,”
creating a panic that injured six people, three seriously.111 Edwin Wertz (who might
have been in the audience) could easily have had this incident in mind when he em-
ployed the theater analogy ten years later at the Cleveland trial of Eugene Debs.
There were also failed attempts to cause panics.112 In 1905, five men interrupted
a Yiddish performance at Chicago’s Academy of Music by shouting “fire” from
different places in the audience and rushing for the exits.113 Policemen intervened
quickly, averted a panic, and arrested the shouters.114 The incident could have been
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Many Trampled to Death: A False Alarm of Fire Causes a Terrible Panic in a Johnstown
Theater, MILWAUKEE DAILY J., Dec. 11, 1889, at 1.
103 24 Deaths in a Panic, WASH. POST, Dec. 31, 1895, at 12.
104 Id.
105 Five Dead in Theater Panic, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Jan. 13, 1901, at 1.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 2.
108 Id.
109 Panic in a Church; 3 Dead; 24 Injured, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Apr. 15, 1906, at 1.
110 Id.; Boy’s Prank Causes Panic: Cry of Fire in Chicago Church Stampedes Easter
Crowd and Four Are Crushed to Death, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 15, 1906, at 24.
111 Six Injured in Theater Panic, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1909, at I2.
112 See, e.g., infra notes 113–15 and accompanying text.
113 Panic in Theater Started by Plot, CHI. DAILY TRIB., June 9, 1905, at 5.
114 Id. The Chicago Daily Tribune noted that
attendants of the theater assert a rivalry exists among the Yiddish players
resembling that which caused riots and murder in the early days of the
New York stage. The performances in local Yiddish playhouses fre-
quently have been interrupted by adherents of the rival stars and the
police called in to suppress trouble.
Id.
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much worse, considering the audience was likely primed for fear of fire—approxi-
mately six hundred people had been killed in a notorious Chicago theater fire in 1903.115
Other false shouts of “fire” in a theater caused panics but did not result in fatal-
ities.116 These incidents, widely reported across the nation, occurred in San Francisco
in 1875;117 in New York City in 1877,118 1881,119 1883,120 1884,121 1888,122 and 1907;123
in Memphis in 1880;124 in Chicago in 1883125 and 1884;126 in St. Louis in 1887127 and
1896;128 in Cincinnati in 1887;129 in Pottsville, New York, in 1888;130 in Boston in
1895;131 in Niles, Michigan, in 1897;132 in Newark in 1901;133 in Pittsburgh in 1911;134
in Wheeling, West Virginia, in 1911;135 in St. Paul, Minnesota, in 1914;136 and in
115 All but Four Claimed: Two More of the Iroquois Theater Dead are Identified, CHI.
DAILY TRIB., Jan. 5, 1904, at 3.
116 See, e.g., infra notes 117–39 and accompanying text.
117 Panic in a Theater, MILWAUKEE DAILY SENTINEL, Mar. 31, 1875, at 5.
118 Panic in a Theater: What a Cry of Fire Did at Niblo’s Garden, ST. LOUIS GLOBE-
DEMOCRAT, Nov. 2, 1877, at 2.
119 A Fearful Panic Last Night in a Crowded Bowery Theatre: Some Fool, Hearing the
Hissing of Escaping Steam, Cries “Fire!,” CHI. DAILY TRIB., Nov. 25, 1881, at 5.
120 Panic in a Theater: Caused by the Lights Going Out and a Cry of Fire, MILWAUKEE
DAILY J., Oct. 18, 1883, at 1.
121 A Cry of Fire in a Crowded Theatre, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1884, at 4.
122 A Panic in a Theater, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Dec. 2, 1888, at 1.
123 Panic in Theatre at Cry of Fire: Bad Brooklyn Boy Started It for Revenge When
Ejected from the Gotham, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 1907, at 2.
124 An Exciting Scene: A Panic in Leubrie’s Theater Caused by a False Alarm of Fire,
DAILY ARK. GAZETTE, Jan. 4, 1880, at 1.
125 A Panic in a Theater, MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, Dec. 13, 1883, at 5.
126 A Theatre Panic: A False Cry of Fire Terrorizes the Audience at the Academy of
Music, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Oct. 20, 1884, at 1.
127 Panic in a Theater: A False Cry of Fire Quickly Empties the People’s Theater, ST.
LOUIS GLOBE-DEMOCRAT, Mar. 28, 1887, at 7.
128 False Fire Alarm Causes a Panic: Reckless Spectator in a St. Louis Theater Empties
the House in Quick Order, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Oct. 8, 1896, at 1.
129 Almost a Theatre Horror: Somebody Cries “Fire” in a Cincinnati Play-House and a
Panic Ensues, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Oct. 2, 1887, at 11.
130 Somebody Shouted “Fire”: A Panic Created in a Pottsville Theater by a Causeless
Alarm, WASH. POST, Dec. 27, 1888, at 1.
131 Items of General News, ME. FARMER, May 23, 1895, at 8.
132 Panic in a Theater: During a Real Fight on the Stage at Niles, Mich., a Cry of Fire is
Raised—Many People Injured, MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, Sept. 12, 1897, at 1.
133 Panic in a Theatre, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1901, at 1.
134 Crushed in Theatre Panic: Children Trampled When Some One Shouted False Alarm
of Fire, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1911, at 1.
135 Child Averts a Panic: Girl Piano Player Calms Audience After False Fire Alarm, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 31, 1911, at 1.
136 Boy’s Cry Starts a Panic, S.F. CHRON., May 6, 1914, at 21.
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Annapolis, Maryland, in 1919.137 There was also an 1881 incident at a church in Brad-
ford, Pennsylvania,138 and a 1904 incident at a church in New Haven, Connecticut.139
One especially intriguing incident occurred in 1912, about ten blocks from Justice
Holmes’s house in Washington, D.C.140 A motion picture screening at a theater was
disrupted by a false cry of “fire,” resulting in the audience making “frantic efforts
to get to the street.”141 Although no one was seriously injured, several women and
children were knocked down.142 The theater’s manager told the Washington Post,
“I would like to find the man who spread the alarm. I would teach him not to repeat
his act.”143
False shouts of “fire” were equally problematic in the United Kingdom. In 1878,
a British publication surveyed recent theater panics, all of which had been triggered
by false shouts of “fire.”144 It noted an 1840s incident at the Victoria Theatre in
London that led to several deaths and many serious injuries, an 1856 incident at a
religious service at the Surrey Music Hall that resulted in many casualties, an 1870
incident in Liverpool that resulted in at least a dozen deaths, and an 1878 incident
in Liverpool in which thirty-seven people were crushed to death.145 The incidents
kept occurring.146 In 1884, a recently fired employee falsely shouted “fire” in the Star
Theater in Glasgow, creating a panic that resulted in sixteen deaths and twelve serious
injuries.147 In 1887, someone falsely shouted “fire” at a London theater during a per-
formance by the Hebrew Dramatic Club.148 A “terrible panic” ensued, and it “was
found that twelve women and five youths had been trampled to death in the rush to
escape, and many others injured.”149
The image of a “man falsely shouting ‘fire’ in a theater and causing a panic”
was thus not simply a clever hypothetical invented on the spot to spice up a judicial
opinion or a closing argument. False shouts of “fire” were a pervasive problem that
plagued theaters throughout the United States and the United Kingdom, resulting in
hundreds of deaths and injuries. Although the comparison is not exact, false shouts
137 Start Scare in Theater, WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 1919, at 3.
138 Methodist Episcopal, W. CHRISTIAN ADVOC., Oct. 12, 1881, at 325.
139 Four Hurt in Church Panic, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1904, at 2.
140 Holmes’s house was at 1720 I Street, NW. LIVA BAKER, THE JUSTICE FROM BEACON
HILL: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF OLIVER WENDELL HOMES 372 (1991).
141 Fire Cry Scares Audience, WASH. POST, Feb. 12, 1912, at 10.
142 Id.
143 Id. The theater was located at 608 9th Street, NW. WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 1909, at T3
(advertisement for the Virginia Theater).
144 Panic and Panics, ALL THE YEAR ROUND, Nov. 30, 1878, at 512.
145 Id. at 513–15.
146 See, e.g., infra notes 147–49 and accompanying text.
147 Around the World, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 2, 1884, at 8.
148 A Fiendish Joke: The Cry of Fire in a London Theater Causes Panic and Terrible
Scenes, DAILY INTER OCEAN, Jan. 19, 1887, at 1.
149 Id.
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of “fire” in theaters were a problem similar to that of school shootings in our own
day. Justice Holmes, an Anglophile who loved the theater, was almost certainly aware
of the scope of the problem, and Edwin Wertz likely was as well.
Indeed, so widespread was the problem of false shouts of “fire” in the theater
that the false shouter, typically described as a “fool” or an “idiot,” had become a recog-
nized stock villain of late nineteenth and early twentieth century popular discourse.150
The earliest parallel I have found is from 1723.151 Daniel Defoe argued:
If it is Criminal to cry Fire in the City, when there is no Fire, be-
cause of the Hurry and Fright it puts the Neighbourhood into; if
it be Criminal in the Camp for a Centinel upon Duty to fire his
Musket when he is not Attacked, or sees no Enemy; what do
these Men deserve, who give a false Alarm to a whole Nation,
and for every Fever, or Sickly Season, which may happen Abroad,
cry Fire?152
Defoe’s nineteenth-century biographer, William Minto, seems to have drawn on this
image, arguing:
It is possible, however, that [the royal judges] deemed the mere
titles of [Defoe’s] pamphlets offences in themselves, disturbing
cries raised while the people were not yet clear of the forest of
anarchy, and still subject to dangerous panics—offences of the
same nature as if a man should shout fire in sport in a crowded
theatre.153
By 1873, the problem of false shouts of “fire” in theaters was widely recog-
nized.154 The New York literary magazine Appleton’s Journal wrote:
There is a fellow who should be made to run the gantlet [sic] of
the press. He should be scathed in Maine, trolloped in Massa-
chusetts, denounced in Connecticut, whipped in New York,
pilloried in Philadelphia, and made to undergo everywhere else
whatever punishment the ingenuity of man can devise. This fel-
low is of several aliases, but he is known to everybody as the
150 See, e.g., infra notes 151–59 and accompanying text.
151 Daniel Defoe, On the Pleasure of Writing Dismal Stories, Exciting Surprize and Horror,
in 3 WILLIAM LEE, DANIEL DEFOE: HIS LIFE, AND RECENTLY DISCOVERED WRITINGS 209
(London, 1869) (1723).
152 Id.
153 WILLIAM MINTO, DANIEL DEFOE 107 (1879).
154 See APPLETON’S J., Mar. 22, 1873, at 410.
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man who suddenly shouts “Fire!” in theatres and other crowded
places, to the consternation of the audience. He did it last Sunday
night, says the Arcadian, at the Academy of Music, during a ser-
mon by Mr. Talmage, and of course there was the usual terrible
panic. He has appeared twice at Niblo’s during the performance
of “Leo and Lotos.” He is pretty sure to be present on every
occasion when the assembly is large, the difficulty of exit great,
and the people in a condition to be easily alarmed. We earnestly
hope he will be caught in the act ere long, and suffer summary
justice at the nearest lamp-post.155
A newspaper noted in 1884 that “the fellow who attempts to create a cholera-scare
is a brother to the idiot who shouts ‘Fire!’ in a crowded theatre.”156 That same year,
a medical journal argued that the “fool or knave [who] cries ‘Fire’ in a public
assembly” was worse than a murderer and that “[h]anging is too good for such a
criminal.”157 Another medical journal in 1888 referred to someone yelling “in about
the same voice that the escaped idiot yells ‘Fire!’ at the theatre.”158 An 1889 column
assumed the shouter was widely recognizable:
A man with a big appreciation for humor (probably first cousin to
the fellow who shouts “Fire!” in a crowded theatre) took down
the calendar in a large commercial office and hung up in its place
one which was two years old. Important papers were dated from
this old calendar and the result was a loss of $30,000.159
Falsely shouting “fire” in a theater soon made its way into the plot devices of
fiction. In an 1882 short story, “Fire! Fire!,” a man decides to take revenge on the
manager of a theater by falsely shouting “fire” during a performance.160 The ensuing
panic results in the death of a small child.161 When the shouter returns home, he dis-
covers that the victim is his own daughter, who had begged to be taken to the theater
that morning.162 It is not entirely improbable that Justice Holmes himself may have
read this story, as it was published in Boston by George M. Baker, in a series that
155 Id.
156 Edgar L. Wakeman, Editorial, THE CURRENT, Aug. 2, 1884, at 66 (quoting the Chicago
Evening Mail).
157 Panics in Public Assemblies, 51 MED. & SURGICAL REP. 666 (1884).
158 How to Deal with Croup, SANITARY ERA, Jan. 15, 1888, at 147.
159 The Trade Lounger, Roundabouts, AM. STATIONER, Mar. 7, 1889, at 584.
160 Meriem, Fire! Fire!, in 12 READING CLUB & HANDY SPEAKER 80–83 (George M. Baker
ed., 1882).
161
Id. at 82–83.
162
Id.
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included works by Justice Holmes’s father, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Sr.163 An 1884
parody claimed that the Republican National Convention had been disrupted when
“some one [sic] in the gallery yelled fire, and every one in the building made a rush
for the doors . . . . Hundreds of spectators were injured, and one Hayes delegate was
killed.”164 In a 1911 school textbook, students were instructed to “[w]rite a story in
accordance with one of the suggestions given below . . . . Some one [sic] shouts ‘Fire!’
in a theater packed to the doors. The manager tries to reassure the audience, but a
panic seems imminent.”165
The false shout of “fire” in a theater was an equally well-known problem in
England. The humor magazine Punch offered this “Advice to Playgoers” in 1881:
When the footlights flare above the glasses, or there is the slight-
est smell of burning paper or linen, stand up in the body of the
house and shout “Fire!” as loudly as possible. Having created a
panic, and being directed to outlets that are not altogether famil-
iar to you—some of them labelled “Exit to be used in case of
fire”—insist upon going out by the entrance or entrances you
always come in at, and insist upon going out in the most disor-
derly manner. Knock over as many seats as you can find unfixed,
upset people who are smaller and weaker than yourself, and do
not hesitate for a moment to trample on them if they are foolish
enough to lie on the floor.166
A year later, a short story appeared in which police fabricate a charge against three
Oxford undergraduates, alleging that they had
rushed into the room where an entertainment was being given, and
shouted “Fire” at the top of [their] voices, and continued to shout
“Fire” until there was a complete panic, which caused several
ladies to be crushed almost to death, and the whole of the audi-
ence struggled out of the place in a state of alarm and demanded
their money back.167
163 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Ballad of the Oysterman, in 3 READING CLUB & HANDY
SPEAKER 45–46 (George M. Baker ed., 1876).
164 By Cheap Cab Special to Life, LIFE, June 12, 1884, at 333.
165 CHARLES MAURICE STEBBINS, A PROGRESSIVE COURSE IN ENGLISH FOR SECONDARY
SCHOOLS 269 (1911); see also HOLMAN DAY, BLOW THE MAN DOWN: A ROMANCE OF THE
COAST 254 (1916) (“Like the fool who shouts ‘Fire’ in a throng, this brainless individual
revived all the fears of the frenzied passengers.”).
166 Advice to Playgoers, PUNCH, Apr. 9, 1881, at 158.
167 William Frederick Traill, The Unjust Proctor, in TALES OF MODERN OXFORD 44, 51
(1882).
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Another British magazine queried, “Which is the safest theatre? timid people may
ask, and, according to the managers, every theatre is as safe as the rest—only more
so. But when the inevitable idiot jumps up and shouts ‘Fire!’ and the other idiots
begin rushing the wrong way, where are you?”168 A British naval historian noted,
“Some miserable idiot in a theatre cries ‘Fire!’ and the whole house becomes a body
of lunatics, men trampling women under foot, and tearing each other to pieces to
escape from a safe building.”169
The false shouter in the theater was an obvious analogy for persons who started
financial panics.170 An 1893 article complaining about the “intemperate talk of the
silver inflationists” warned:
The man who yells “fire” in a crowded hall may be an extremely
insignificant person, yet he is likely to cause a great deal of fright
and perhaps destruction. If it turns out that there was no fire, that
it was a false alarm, the injury inflicted is the same, and what shall
be said of the miscreant or idiot who originated the scare?171
A 1905 letter in the American Economist argued, “Free-Traders advocating a revi-
sion [of the tariff] are like the schoolboy who for fun cries ‘Fire’ from the lobby of
a theatre, not realizing until it is too late that he will be trampled on in the panic
which his thoughtlessness creates.”172 As Congressman George Gorman of Illinois
asserted in 1913:
The man who cries panic when there is no panic occupies the
same relative position in, and performs the same relative service
to, society as the man who did not know the gun was loaded or
who rocks the boat, or the man who cries fire in a crowded play-
house when, in fact, there is no fire.173
A 1916 article, warning against financial pessimism, claimed, “He who shouts ‘fire’
in a theatre may create a panic when there is no danger. The wise and courageous
man will keep the band playing, the people calm and try to put the fire out.”174
168 The Only Jones, JUDY, OR THE LONDON SERIO-COMIC J., Nov. 9, 1887, at 220.
169 WALTER JEFFERY, A CENTURY OF OUR SEA STORY 193 (1900).
170 See, e.g., infra notes 171–74 and accompanying text.
171 Minority Rule Imperiling Great Interests, SHOE & LEATHER REP., Aug. 17, 1893, at 373.
172 William Barbour, Letter to the Editor, A Tariff Bill Would Be Disastrous, AM. ECON.,
Mar. 17, 1905, at 128.
173 51 CONG. REC. app. 54 (1914) (statement of Rep. Gorman).
174 Theo. H. Price, An Unnecessary Prophecy of Pessimism, COM. & FIN., Jan. 12, 1916,
at 39.
200 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 24:181
Moral reformers put a new twist on the theater shouter in 1912 by imagining the
culprit as a female.175 In a stern warning against unsuitable juvenile literature, the
Bulletin of the New Hampshire Public Libraries asked, “Would you have your young
people associate with a girl who would deliberately try to maim a companion by run-
ning into her while coasting; or a girl who would yell fire in a theatre to stampede
the audience . . . ?”176
The stupidity of the shouter was a recurrent theme.177 A 1902 letter to Harper’s
magazine asked:
Did he ever attend a theatre or hall full of people, and have a
fire-apparatus drive past the door, and some man fool in the
house shout “fire,” and immediately the audience make one rush
for the door? No; the horse is not alone in being part maniac and
part idiot.178
Another writer complained, “In a crowded theater the fool, who cries ‘fire’ can raise
more commotion in a minute than a hundred actors on the stage can subdue.”179 Still
another warned of the “kind of a lunatic who cries ‘fire!’ in a crowded auditorium
when he smells a little smoke.”180 An actress explained that “among the necessary
acquirements for the actress is an unshakable self-control . . . . She must not scream
when the perennial gallery-idiot yells, ‘Fire!’”181 An architect warned about the
condition of a Minneapolis theater, noting, “Its top gallery is such that any time a
fool cries fire, a most horrible disaster may be expected, aside from the ever present
danger of conflagration.”182 The Los Angeles Times opined in 1907, under the
headline “Lost Opportunity”:
It is a pity that the man who yelled “fire” at the Orpheum Mon-
day night is not known. He ought to be advertised throughout
the city and exhibited as the brainless wonder. If he and the men
who started the panic in the balcony could have been put in the
ring at Naud Junction last night and beaten up, there would have
been some satisfaction in going to a prize fight.183
175 The Indictment Against Harmful Juveniles, BULL. OF THE N.H. PUB. LIBR., Dec. 1912,
at 136–37.
176 Id.
177 See, e.g., infra notes 178–81 and accompanying text.
178 Walter R. Swank, A Defence of the Horse, HARPER’S WKLY., Aug. 30, 1902, at 1197.
179 The Faddist of Fads, AM. SCH. BD. J., June 1901, at 9.
180 Stray Shots from Solomon, CAN. SHOE & LEATHER J., Jan. 1901, at 517.
181 Clara Morris, How the Actor Saves the Play, SCRAP BOOK, Aug. 1908, at 263.
182 Robert Craik McLean, A Warning in Regard to Minneapolis Chief Play House, 15 W.
ARCHITECT 25, 27 (1910).
183 Lost Opportunity, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1907, at II4.
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Other Americans pointed to audience training as the solution to needless panics.184
A 1914 letter to the trade magazine Motion Picture argued:
In view of the many casualties in Motion Picture theaters, due to
the panic caused by some fiend shouting, “Fire!” would it not be
a good idea to continually show the following on the screen in
large letters: IF SOME FIEND SHOUTS “FIRE” PLEASE DO
NOT START A PANIC, KEEP COOL; EACH PANIC MEANS
DEATH! or words to that effect, and thereby we could possibly
teach the public to disregard the demon call to their own destruc-
tion. The idea would be install a disregard for the cry of fire
similar to the effect now shown by our school-children when the
fire-alarm is sounded in their schoolrooms; they simply get up
and get out in an orderly fashion.185
Another writer pointed out that “[t]he ‘natural’ and human thing to do when some-
one cries ‘fire’ in a crowded theatre is for the whole audience to rise and rush. And
unless they have learned previously through a certain intellectual discipline to re-
strain their natural impulses they will destroy themselves.”186
Municipalities responded with provisions criminalizing false shouts of “fire.”187
As early as 1823, the city of Cincinnati enacted “An Ordinance to Prevent False Alarms
of Fire.”188 The 1917 Indianapolis Municipal Code made it a crime to “[c]ry out a
false alarm of ‘fire’ in any church, public hall, theater, moving picture showroom,
or any other building of a similar or different character, while the same is occupied
by a public assemblage.”189 A 1913 commentator noted, “The cry of ‘fire’ in a public
assembly creates a panic. No word in the American language is more menacing, more
stirring, more alarming to human consciousness. For a person to shout ‘fire’ in a
crowd, when there is no fire, is a misdemeanor severely punishable by law.”190
The theater shouter also appeared in legal proceedings.191 In 1894 a Missouri ap-
pellate court rhetorically asked:
184 See MASS. PLOUGHMAN, Mar. 26, 1904, at 4.
185 B. Von Suskil, Letter, Keep Cool: Each Panic Means Death, MOTION PICTURE MAG.,
Feb. 1914, at 168; see also MASS. PLOUGHMAN, supra note 184, at 4 (“A man in a Salem
audience the other day has apparently established an antidote for the fellow who yells ‘fire.’
Slapping a neighbor’s face may not be altogether dignified, but it evidently has value in changing
the current of your neighbor’s thoughts at the moment when he is about to precipitate a panic.”).
186 NORMAN ANGELL, THE POLITICAL CONDITIONS OF ALLIED SUCCESS 307 (1918).
187 See infra notes 188–89.
188 Cincinnati, Ohio, Ordinance to Prevent False Alarms of Fire (Sept. 10, 1823).
189 INDIANAPOLIS, IND., MUNICIPAL CODE § 702(8) (1917).
190 M. C. Huggett, Fire Prevention and the Individual, 2 GRAND RAPIDS PROGRESS 203,
204 (1913).
191 See Ephland v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 57 Mo. App. 147, 165 (1894).
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If the servant in charge and control of a crowded theater, in the
presence and hearing of an audience, negligently, falsely and
loudly cries, “fire, run for your lives,” would not the proprietor
be liable for the damage resulting from the conduct consequent
upon the terror which this might excite, whether he addressed
his fellow servants or the audience?192
In a 1915 labor arbitration, Warren S. Stone, the prominent head of a railroad workers’
union, argued:
Gentlemen, there will always be three jobs waiting for the fool
killer: one is the fool who rocks the boat; one is the fool who cries
“fire” in a crowded theatre; and greatest of all, is the fool who
turns a switch light red in the face of a fast passenger train.193
Curiously, Stone was from Cleveland, Ohio, where Edwin Wertz practiced law and
where Eugene Debs would be prosecuted three years later.194
There were even early attempts to link the theater shouter to the problem of
radical speech.195 In 1908, the Wall Street Journal, anticipating the Supreme Court’s
subsequent fascination with fire metaphors, opined:
But if there should be a political conflagration it will come from
a sensational, exaggerated, passionate, anarchical use of words.
Many a great forest fire has been started by the carelessness of
campers. A theatre panic has had its origins in some fool shout-
ing “fire.” Chicago was destroyed by a cow kicking over a lamp.
Revolution might be inaugurated by some coward using words
addressed to the evil passions of the mob.196
192 Id. Holmes, who was “deeply interested” in the “liability of an employer for the negligence
of his employees,” may have been aware of this case. HEALY, supra note 45, at 269.
193 Closing Argument of Warren S. Stone on Behalf of the Brotherhood of Locomotive
Engineers and the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, in 9 PROCEEDINGS:
ARBITRATION BETWEEN THE WESTERN RAILROADS AND THE BROTHERHOOD OF LOCOMOTIVE
ENGINEERS AND THE BROTHERHOOD OF LOCOMOTIVE FIREMEN AND ENGINEMEN UNDER THE
ACT APPROVED JULY 15, 1913, BY AGREEMENT DATED AUGUST 3, 1914, at 7776 (1915).
194 Engel v. Pottsville Div. No. 90, Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 46 Pa. C. 171, 172 (1917).
195 See The Use of Language, WALL ST. J., Aug. 15, 1908, at l.
196 Id. Similar language persisted after Schenck. See, e.g., The American Workman vs. The
Bolshevik, THE BULLETIN, July 1919, at 3 (“The man who throws a bomb these days, who
denounces our mode of government, who waves the red flag instead of the Stars and Stripes,
who tries to stir up class hatred, who prods capital on one hand and labor on the other, who says
to each that they have nothing in common, who urges both to take advantage of the re-
adjustment period and ‘grab while the grabbing is good,’ such a man is full brother to a fool
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By the time Justice Holmes turned his pen to the Schenck opinion in 1919, the
theater shouter had become a well-established villain of popular culture. Far from spin-
ning a creative hypothetical, Holmes drew on one of the tritest examples imaginable.
The person who falsely shouted “fire” in a theater was widely condemned for his
stupid, dangerous speech. For Holmes’s readers, the analogy may well have func-
tioned as simple shorthand for all stupid, harmful speech.
This survey of popular culture also answers the question of how Holmes’s theater
became crowded. It is not from misquoting;197 the theater was always crowded. By
1919, “shouting ‘fire’ in a crowded theater” was, if not exactly a cliché, at least a
well-worn formulation that permeated public discourse across a wide variety of
subjects. Edwin Wertz, in the Debs trial, followed conventional semantics by refer-
ring to a “crowded auditorium, or any theatre.”198 Although Justice Holmes removed
the crowd from the Schenck opinion, he was not able to remove it from popular
consciousness and standard linguistic convention. The phrase “shouting ‘fire’ in a
crowded theater” long predated Schenck and continued to be used long after Schenck
was decided.199 This persistence may have something do with its metrical qualities;
“shouting ‘fire’ in a crowded theater” has a natural rhythm that “falsely shouting ‘fire’
in a theater and causing a panic” lacks.200
One of the first courts to employ the analogy after Schenck understood exactly
what was at stake. In 1922, the Oregon Supreme Court held:
who rocks the boat, the knave who yells ‘fire’ in a theatre, the slabsided ‘maverick’ that piles
the herd up at the bottom of a pit. American labor will be the first to single that man out and
demand that he be expelled from the country.”).
197 See, e.g., William Safire, On Language: Dominoes’ Return, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 1995),
http://www.nytimes.com/1995/03/05/magazine/on-language-dominoes-return.html (condemning
“shouting fire in a crowded theater” as a misquote of Holmes); Elio Gaspari, Letter to the Editor,
To Shout Fire in a Crowded Theater, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1979, at A18 (condemning the
omission of “falsely” and stating “[i]t is fortunate that the First Amendment protects those who
omit key words from judicial aphorisms, causing panic in crowded constitutional questions.”).
198 See HEALY, supra note 45.
199 Schenck appears to have made little difference in popular usages of the phrase. See,
e.g., IRENE CASTLE, MY HUSBAND 51 (1919) (“Paris was like a crowded theatre in which
someone had shouted ‘fire.’ People seemed to have lost all judgment and sense of balance.”);
H. C. WITWER, A SMILE A MINUTE 276 (1919) (“Alongside of the boob which buys a second-
hand auto, Joe, the idiotic simp which rocks the boat, the pinhead that yells ‘Fire!’ in the
theatre, and the hick that thinks they’s a fortune in bettin’ on the races, is shrewd, wise
guys.”); Community Co-operation Needed to Solve After-War Problems, AM. LUMBERMAN,
Aug. 16, 1919, at 47 (“The person who in times of scarcity and high prices buys beyond his
needs, who predicts further advances at the same time that he adds to the demand that will
bring such advances about, is like him who in a crowded room shouts, ‘Fire!’ and produces
a panic.”); A “Sailor’s Snug Harbor” for Retired Admirals!, HERALD OF GOSPEL LIBERTY,
Sept. 17, 1925, at 910 (“For many of Admiral Fiske’s utterances are too much like such
occupations as investigating gasoline tanks with lighted matches, yelling ‘Fire!’ in crowded
theaters, and rocking boats filled with women and children.”).
200 I am indebted to Aaron Caplan for this point.
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No man can enter a crowded theater, falsely shout fire, and thus
cause a panic resulting in the crushing, maiming, and killing of
enfeebled men, helpless women, and innocent children, and then
justify his conduct by brazenly proclaiming that he did no more
than to exercise his constitutional right of free speech.201
The hypothetical was unmistakably real and so were the dead men, women, and
children.
II. THE ANALOGY IN THE COURTS
Once Justice Holmes introduced the theater analogy into the United States
Reports, it took on a life of its own. As a pithy explanation of the limits of constitu-
tional rights, it was irresistibly attractive to judges, even if they didn’t always quote
it precisely. This Part examines the judicial treatment of the analogy, first in the United
States Supreme Court and then in American courts more generally.
A. In the Supreme Court
The theater analogy lay dormant at the Supreme Court for over twenty years
until Justice Felix Frankfurter invoked it in his 1941 dissenting opinion in Bridges
v. California.202 Frankfurter wrote, “One cannot yell ‘Fire’ in a crowded theater.”203
Although Frankfurter revered Justice Holmes, this paraphrase typified the casual
judicial treatment of Schenck; the critical element of falsity had disappeared, as had
the resulting panic, and the theater had been made crowded. Four years later, in
Thomas v. Collins,204 a majority of the Court, citing to Schenck, employed the para-
phrase for the first time: “We have here nothing comparable to the case where use
of the word ‘fire’ in a crowded theater creates a clear and present danger which the
State may undertake to avoid or against which it may protect.”205 With this decision,
the Court brought the more traditional and colloquial form of the theater analogy into
legal respectability.
In fairness to Justice Frankfurter and the Court, it is worth noting that even
Justice Holmes didn’t always use his own analogy precisely.206 A few weeks after
the opinion in Schenck was announced, Holmes referred to it in a letter:
201 State v. Laundy, 204 P. 958, 965 (Or. 1922).
202 314 U.S. 252, 296 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
203 Id.
204 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
205 Id. at 536.
206 See Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Alice Stopford Green, Mar. 26, 1919,
http://ids.lib.harvard.edu/ids/view/43005715 [http://perma.cc/HJ3R-XJZL] [hereinafter Letter
from Holmes]; see also HEALY, supra note 45, at 110 (discussing similar letters from Holmes
to other correspondents).
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Of course there was a lot of talk about free speech, in favor of
which I should go as far as anyone, but, as I said, the powers of
the Constitution certainly never supposed that the provision for
it gave a man immunity for counselling a murder or falsely crying
fire in a theatre.207
In this paraphrase, “crying” has replaced “shouting,” and “causing a panic” has dis-
appeared entirely.
In subsequent cases, the analogy played only a minimal role in Supreme Court
majority and plurality opinions. Other than the paraphrase in Thomas, the theater
analogy has been quoted directly in only two majority opinions208 and two plurality
opinions.209 It went unmentioned in United States v. Alvarez,210 addressing the con-
stitutionality of criminalizing false statements about receiving the Medal of Honor.211
The Ninth Circuit had discussed the theater analogy extensively, since it was the
classic example of a false statement of fact unprotected by the First Amendment.212
But none of the Justices thought it merited discussion.213
The analogy has nonetheless flourished in separate opinions, mostly dissents.214
For example, Justice Stephen Breyer invoked the analogy to justify restrictions on
sales of video games in his dissent in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants.215 In his
dissent in New York Times Co. v. United States,216 Chief Justice Warren Burger used
the analogy, albeit with the opposite of Holmesian concision: “Of course, the First
Amendment right itself is not an absolute, as Justice Holmes so long ago pointed out
in his aphorism concerning the right to shout ‘fire’ in a crowded theater if there was
no fire.”217
Justice William O. Douglas discussed the analogy more than any other Justice,
perhaps because it presented such a challenge to his generally absolutist view of the
207 Letter from Holmes, supra note 206.
208 NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 927 (1982); Cox v. Louisiana, 379
U.S. 559, 563 (1965).
209 FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 744 (1978) (plurality opinion) (Stevens, J.);
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 86 (1949) (plurality opinion) (Reed, J.).
210 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012).
211 See id.
212 United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198, 1214 (9th Cir. 2010).
213 See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537.
214 See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 399 (1992) (White, J., concurring);
Smith v. Collin, 439 U.S. 916, 919 (1978) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Smith v. United States,
431 U.S. 291, 318 n.16 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 298
(1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
215 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2763 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
216 N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
217 Id. at 749 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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First Amendment. In his dissenting opinion in Beauharnais v. Illinois,218 Douglas con-
ceded “that even without the element of conspiracy there might be times and occa-
sions when the legislative or executive branch might call a halt to inflammatory talk,
such as the shouting of ‘fire’ in a school or theatre.”219 Such restrictions were permis-
sible if the perils of speech were “clear and present, leaving no room for argument,
raising no doubts as to the necessity of curbing speech in order to prevent disaster.”220
In his concurring opinion in Brandenburg v. Ohio,221 he argued, “The example usually
given by those who would punish speech is the case of one who falsely shouts fire in
a crowded theatre. This is, however, a classic case where speech is brigaded with
action.”222 Similarly, in his dissenting opinion in Miller v. California,223 Douglas
argued, “Whenever speech and conduct are brigaded—as they are when one shouts
‘Fire’ in a crowded theater—speech can be outlawed.”224 Finally, in his dissenting
opinion in Pittsburgh Press v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations,225 he
wrote, “There comes a time, of course, when speech and action are so closely brigaded
that they are really one. Falsely shouting ‘fire’ in a theater, the example given by
Mr. Justice Holmes . . . is one example.”226
Taken literally, Douglas’s arguments in Brandenburg, Miller, and Pittsburgh
Press are almost nonsensical. A person who shouts “fire” in a theater is engaging
in pure speech, not conduct; indeed, the pure speech aspect is what makes the analogy
so powerful. And even if the shout was viewed as combining speech and conduct,
it would still be subject to the O’Brien test and not simply analyzed as a form of
conduct.227 What Douglas is suggesting with the unusual term “brigaded,” more
likely, is what he more explicitly stated in Beauharnais: that the shout triggers im-
mediate consequences (conduct by others) that cannot be countered by more speech.228
It is thus distinctly different from most other forms of speech.
Curiously, the most extensive discussion of the theater analogy in a Supreme
Court majority opinion occurred in a Takings Clause case. In Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission,229 the Court invalidated a condition that a homeowner grant
a public easement in exchange for permission to remodel a house.230 Justice Scalia’s
opinion for the Court argued:
218 Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
219 Id. at 284–87 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
220 Id. at 284–85 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
221 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
222 Id. at 456 (Douglas, J., concurring).
223 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
224 Id. at 42 n.6 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
225 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
226 Id. at 398 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
227 See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
228 See 343 U.S. 250, 255–56 (1952).
229 See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
230 Id. at 837.
2015] “SHOUTING ‘FIRE’ IN A THEATER” 207
The evident constitutional propriety disappears, however, if the
condition substituted for the prohibition utterly fails to further
the end advanced as the justification for the prohibition. When
that essential nexus is eliminated, the situation becomes the same
as if California law forbade shouting fire in a crowded theater,
but granted dispensations to those willing to contribute $100 to
the state treasury. While a ban on shouting fire can be a core
exercise of the State’s police power to protect the public safety,
and can thus meet even our stringent standards for regulation of
speech, adding the unrelated condition alters the purpose to one
which, while it may be legitimate, is inadequate to sustain the ban.
Therefore, even though, in a sense, requiring a $100 tax contri-
bution in order to shout fire is a lesser restriction on speech than
an outright ban, it would not pass constitutional muster.231
The analogy is a bit strained, and it is not entirely clear precisely why Justice Scalia
thinks his hypothesized California theater law would violate the First Amendment. It
is not explicitly based on content or viewpoint; instead, it simply allows one to pur-
chase an exemption from an otherwise applicable law. If strict scrutiny is the governing
standard (and it is not clear that it is), one could argue that the State’s willingness to
sell exemptions so cheaply undermines the claim that the law serves a compelling state
interest. But if the exemption were priced higher, say $5 million, that argument would
lose most of its force. The strongest argument against the hypothesized statute is
probably not a First Amendment argument but a more generic constitutional argu-
ment against allowing individuals to purchase exemptions from regulations of any
sort.232 Even then, there’s still a problem of remedy—should a court merely strike the
exemption or invalidate the entire statute? Suffice it to say with Nollan, Justice Scalia
has managed to make an unruly analogy even more complicated.
B. In Courts in General
Although of limited use at the Supreme Court, the theater analogy has flourished
in the lower courts.233 Few of these decisions extensively analyze the analogy, but
most employ it in an analytically plausible manner. To give some greater precision
to the analysis, I have assembled a database of published judicial opinions that invoke
the theater analogy. Using Westlaw, my research assistants and I searched for all
231 Id.
232 See Lee Anne Fennell, Hard Bargains and Real Steals: Land Use Exactions Revisited,
86 IOWA L. REV. 1, 56 (2000) (“The sale of the right to violate a valid and important public
safety regulation involves illegitimate governmental action which endangers third parties who
were apparently not represented at the bargaining table (theatergoers who will be trampled
as a result of the ensuing panic).”).
233 See infra notes 234, 238–42 and accompanying text.
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opinions since Schenck involving some variant of “shouting fire,” “crying fire,” or
“yelling fire.” The database is limited to cases involving free speech claims, and I
also excluded opinions where the court was simply repeating arguments made by
counsel or by a lower court in an unpublished opinion. If both a majority opinion
and a concurring or dissenting opinion in a particular case invoked the analogy, each
opinion was entered separately.
1. Summary Statistics
There are a total of 278 opinions.234 Seventy-one are from federal appellate
courts, fifty-two from federal trial courts, one hundred forty-five from state appellate
courts, and ten from state trial courts. The first uses were in 1919 and they continue
to the present day. Usage by decade is shown in Table One.
Table One
Decade Uses of the Analogy Acceptance Rate of
Free Speech Claims
1919 5 0.00%
1920–1929 4 0.00%
1930–1939 2 0.00%
1940–1949 22 27.27%
1950–1959 10 20.00%
1960–1969 31 22.58%
1970–1979 50 28.00%
1980–1989
1990–1999
2000–2009
2010–
42
38
53
21
19.05%
47.37%
32.07%
28.57%
There are fewer uses of the analogy in the earlier decades when there were simply
fewer free speech claims being raised. The limited use is also reflected in casebooks.
Several casebooks from the 1920s included the analogy,235 but many prominent case-
books of the 1930s through the 1950s did not.236 Lawyers who did not learn the
234 A federal district court used the analogy when issuing a temporary restraining order
against The Progressive, but no formal opinion was published. Douglas E. Kneeland, U.S.
Judge Bars Use of an Article on the H-Bomb, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1979, at 1.
235 See, e.g., H. EDGAR BARNES & BYRON A. MILLER, SELECTED CASES IN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 279 (7th ed. 1924); JAMES PARKER HALL, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
1478 (2d ed. 1926); JOSEPH RAGLAND LONG, CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 298 (1926).
236 See, e.g., WALTER F. DODD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (3d ed.
1941); WALTER F. DODD, CASES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
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analogy in law school may have been less inclined to argue it in court or to include
it in drafts they prepared as law clerks. Since the 1960s, the analogy has been used
consistently. If anything, its use is intensifying, with the 2000s showing the most uses
and the 2010s well on track to match it. By now, every lawyer and judge probably
read Schenck as part of his or her legal education, and it comes readily to mind when
confronting First Amendment issues.237
Of the 215 opinions invoking the analogy issued by members of multi-member
panels,238 148 were majority opinions, 2 were plurality opinions, 19 were concurring
opinions, 2 were concurring in part and dissenting in part, and 44 were dissents.
The opinions are approximately evenly split between those that cite and correctly
state Holmes’s formulation in Schenck and those that do not. One hundred sixty-
three of the two hundred seventy-eight opinions (58.63%) cite to Schenck. Slightly
over one-third of opinions (103 or 37.05%) omit the term “falsely.” A slight major-
ity (142 or 51.08%) refer to the theater as “crowded.” Similarly, a slight majority
(146 or 52.52%) omit the phrase “causing a panic.”
2. Acceptance of Free Speech Claims
Not surprisingly, opinions invoking the theater analogy are not especially receptive
to free speech claims. Nearly two-thirds of the opinions rejected the asserted free
speech claim (184 or 66.19%). Seventy-eight (28.06%) accepted the claim, and
seven (2.52%) read a statute narrowly to avoid First Amendment problems. Of the
remaining nine opinions, five partially accepted and partially rejected free speech
claims,239 two did not resolve the matter because qualified immunity was found,240
one denied summary judgment because of disputed material facts,241 and one was
a dissent from a denial of certiorari.242
The rejection rate is instructive, however, only in comparison to some baseline.
If, for example, courts routinely reject 80% of free speech claims, opinions invoking
the analogy would, in general, be more favorable to free speech claims than those
(1932); NOEL T. DOWLING, CASES ON AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1937); FRANK R.
STRONG, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1950).
237 It is also possible that Schenck is typically taught in the first days of a First Amendment
or Constitutional Law II class when students are alert and class attendance is high.
238 One case was heard by a three-judge district court. Nat’l Mar. Union of Am. v. Herzog,
78 F. Supp. 146 (D.D.C. 1948).
239 Ostergren v. Cuccinelli, 615 F.3d 263 (4th Cir. 2010); Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d
356 (4th Cir. 1979); Melton v. Young, 328 F. Supp. 88 (E.D. Tenn. 1971); United Elec., Radio
& Mach. Workers of Am., CIO v. Baldwin, 67 F. Supp. 235 (D. Conn. 1946); Newman v.
Delahunty, 681 A.2d 671 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1994).
240 Gold v. Miami, 121 F.3d 1442 (11th Cir. 1997); Morris v. City of Orlando, No. 6:10-
cv-233-Orl-19GJK, 2010 WL 4646704 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 9, 2010).
241 Sallie v. Lynk, No. 2:10CV456, 2012 WL 995245 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 23, 2012).
242 Smith v. Collin, 439 U.S. 916 (1978) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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that do not. Ideally, one would know the overall success rate of free speech claims.
Regrettably, no such comprehensive data appears to have been assembled, but there
are some hints. Professor Adam Winkler analyzed free speech cases in federal courts
between 1990 and 2003 and found that free speech claims were rejected in only 21%
of the cases.243 This is quite different from the 66.19% for opinions invoking the
theater analogy, suggesting (unsurprisingly) that opinions that employ the analogy
are more likely to rule against free speech claims than opinions that do not.
As Table One indicates, opinions invoking the analogy have some variability by
decade in terms of receptiveness to free speech claims. From 1919 to 1939, no opinion
employing the analogy accepted a free speech claim. In the 1980s, however, nearly
half (47.37%) of the opinions accepted the free speech claim. By the 2010s, how-
ever, the acceptance rate was down to 28.57%, close to historical norms.
Federal and state courts show little variance in their acceptance of free speech
claims, with federal court opinions accepting 26.02% of free speech claims and state
court opinions accepting 29.68%.
Trial court opinions and appellate court opinions, however, diverge more markedly.
Trial court opinions accepted free speech claims in only 15.87% of the cases, com-
pared to 31.63% of the appellate court opinions. This difference narrows somewhat
if partial acceptances of free speech claims are included; 20.6% of trial court opinions
either fully accept or partially accept free speech claims, and appellate court opinions
either fully or partially accept 32.56% of the claims. Nonetheless, appellate opinions
that invoke the analogy are generally more friendly to free speech claims than trial
court opinions.
To a small but consistent degree, opinions that paraphrase Justice Holmes are
more favorable to free speech claims than those that quote him precisely. Opinions
that omitted “falsely” accepted 36.89% of free speech claims; opinions that included
“falsely” accepted 22.85%. Opinions that added “crowded” accepted 31% of free
speech claims; those that did not accepted 25%. Opinions that omitted “causing a
panic” accepted 33.56% of free speech claims; opinions that included “causing a
panic” accepted 22%.
This variation is counter-intuitive, at least in certain respects. The omission of
“falsely” and “causing a panic,” which would leave more speech unprotected by the
First Amendment, should lead to a higher rate of rejection of free speech claims. On
the other hand, adding “crowded” reduces the amount of unprotected speech, at least
slightly, and should lead to a lower rate of rejection.
243 Adam Winkler, Free Speech Federalism, 108 MICH. L. REV. 153, 165 (2009). Ashutosh
Bhagwat analyzed cases employing intermediate scrutiny in free speech cases in the United
States Courts of Appeals from 1983 to 2005, and he found that free speech claims were
rejected in 73% of cases. Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Test That Ate Everything: Intermediate
Scrutiny in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 2007 ILL. L. REV. 783, 809. This rate is higher
than Winkler’s because Winkler’s also includes strict scrutiny cases.
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The causes of this variation are not easy to determine. Although real, the mag-
nitude is still relatively minor. My best guess is that opinions that bother to cite Holmes
correctly view the theater analogy as an important part of the analysis. By contrast,
opinions that employ the paraphrase may do so in a perfunctory manner, a nod to
the obvious limits of free speech, but one that must merely be acknowledged before
reaching more difficult issues.
CONCLUSION
The world in which false shouts of “fire” in a theater were a perennial problem has
fortunately disappeared, leaving Justice Holmes’s analogy in Schenck as its most en-
during legacy. The problem persisted, however, at least into the 1930s. In Schenectady,
New York, in 1931, a fourteen-year-old falsely shouted “fire” from the balcony of a
movie theater, resulting “in a panic which threatened for a time to assume dangerous
proportions.”244 In 1933, six children were injured when someone falsely shouted
“fire” in a Brooklyn movie theater.245 A year later, a group of Columbia undergradu-
ates entered an Upper Broadway movie theater, falsely shouting “fire.”246 The re-
sulting panic injured twenty people.247 As recently as 1975, fifteen people were injured
in Mexico City when someone falsely shouted “fire” and the “audience fled for the
exits in panic.”248
In The Common Law, Holmes argued for the critical role of experience in shaping
the law:
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The
felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theo-
ries . . . even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-
men, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in de-
termining the rules by which men should be governed. The law
embodies the story of a nation’s development through many centu-
ries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms
and corollaries of a book of mathematics. In order to know what it
is, we must know what it has been, and what it tends to become.249
So, too, with the theater analogy, for which Holmes has probably received too much
credit. It is not a timeless truth, a legal axiom from which logical propositions can
then be deduced, but is itself a product of a specific historical and cultural context.
244 Youth’s Shout of Fire Starts Theater Panic, SCHENECTADY GAZETTE, Mar. 9, 1931, at 2.
245 Shouts ‘Fire’ in Theater; 6 Hurt in Rush to Exit, CHI. DAILY TRIB., June 19, 1933, at 8.
246 New York Students Shout “Fire” in Theatre, LEWISTON DAILY SUN, Jan. 9, 1934, at 6.
247 Id.
248 Shout of Fire Hurts 15, MILWAUKEE J., May 26, 1975, at 7.
249 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
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In Schenck, Holmes drew on a rich well of experience and intuition, widely shared
with his fellow Americans. These Americans ranged from Edwin Wertz in Cleveland,
who first used the analogy in a free speech context, to the mourning parents of
Calumet, Michigan, attending the mass burials of their trampled children, to the
thousands of theater patrons who needlessly raced for the exits in fear for their lives,
and to the millions of other Americans who read terrifying accounts of false shouts
of “fire” in newspapers, magazines, and books.
That world is gone, but the theater analogy persists. In its nearly hundred-year
life, however, it has become abstract and remote, a cliché devoid of any relevance
to contemporary Americans. This in itself may have constitutional significance. Our
free speech doctrine has become increasingly libertarian, but our central analogy
about the limits of free speech has largely lost its capacity to frighten.250 If we rou-
tinely analogized, not to a false shout of “fire” in a theater, but to, say, a mugger shout-
ing, “Your money or your life,” free speech law might have developed differently.
Although our trans-ideological and deep rooted commitment to free speech cannot
be explained by the presence of one analogy, it is possible that in a handful of cases,
an antiquated and unfrightening analogy gives greater play to free speech than the
frightening one that Holmes originally employed.
As frequently noted, it is difficult to make predictions, especially about the
future. Yet I suspect that one hundred years from now, constitutional law professors
will still easily elicit the theater analogy when querying students about the limits of
free speech. The scoundrel in the theater has been given a form of immortality. He
will always be there, lurking in our collective consciences, waiting, as the curtain
rises, for just the right moment to ruin a performance with a false shout of “Fire!”
250 I am indebted to Thomas Healy for this point.
